What are some moral judgment examples

III. Foundations of moral philosophy 1. What is the status of moral judgments? In the previous chapter we presented ethics as a - thoroughly practice-oriented - theory of morality. With the claim to theoretical anchoring and practical relevance, there are great challenges for ethics: Can people even recognize what is morally good? Is there "the good" as something that is real, independent of people, that we can strive to discover, or is it a question of common definition, a convention? How can one arrive at moral norms in a consistent manner? Are moral statements truthful? Are moral principles universal and valid for all times or only within a certain cultural context? Are moral judgments generally valid and therefore generally binding, or are they solely subjective? These questions are closely related, but have different orientations. In the following we differentiate the questions about the knowledge, the binding force and the range of moral judgments. 1.1. Can we know what is good? Many people are convinced that they can see beyond any doubt what is morally right. Certain moral judgments appear to them not as a mere matter of opinion, but as "really" right or wrong. In a society where moral judgments are often highly controversial, the question arises of who is "right". In doing so, the fundamental question can be asked whether moral judgments are truthful at all; that is, whether ethical judgments and statements can be judged as right or wrong according to epistemological (not moral) criteria. Depending on how you answer this question, a distinction is made in moral philosophy between cognitivistic and non-cognitivistic approaches: Cognitivistic ethics assume that ethical judgments are truthful, i. H. 33 Example: That unnecessary torture of animals is morally wrong, but that help for people in need is morally right, should appear to most readers not just as a convention, but as a "really" correct statement. cognoscere (Iat.) = to recognize 34 Example of moral philosophical foundations seeing true and recognizing false moral statements. Non-cognitivist ethics deny the truthfulness of ethical judgments. What is morally correct is therefore not a question of knowledge, but of intuition, feeling, personal decision or social convention. This seemingly academic dispute over epistemological questions becomes clear for nature conservation, for example, in the dispute over a possible self-worth of nature (see On the Truthfulness of Moral Judgments using the example "The extermination of a species is morally wrong" The correctness of the judgment "The extermination of a species is morally wrong "may seem obvious to some. In society, however, the view is also held that the extermination of species is morally irrelevant for the sake of higher goals or, in certain cases, even morally imperative. In order to be able to decide who is right one must be able to know what is "really" right. Anyone who believes that criteria exist according to which it is possible to decide whether the extinction of species is morally permitted or not, takes a cognitivist position. that the knowledge of the right thing is simple or on de It is clear, however, that it is in principle possible to recognize the prohibition on the extermination of a certain species as right or wrong. Anyone who believes that such criteria do not exist, that is, whoever thinks that there is no way of recognizing whether the extermination of a species is morally permitted or not, takes a non-cognitivist position. This does not mean that the above judgment is wrong, but it does mean that people cannot tell whether it is wrong or right. As isolated as formulated above, the judgment can obviously hardly be classified as true or false. It looks different when we use certain moral concepts as a basis; then the judgment "The extermination of a species is morally wrong" is very truthful: in an ethics that attaches moral value to all species, the statement can be considered true, while in ethics that consider species to be morally irrelevant, the statement appears false . The problem of truthfulness thus again refers to the question in which context and with which ethical (not so much epistemological) arguments moral values ​​and norms are founded. Moral-philosophical foundations Chap. IV.4.): The view that there are values ​​independent of man in nature is countered by philosophy with the objection that we do not recognize such independent values ​​and thus cannot say anything about them. The question of the truthfulness of moral judgments can best be answered by showing the conditions under which something can be judged as true: both value judgments and factual statements can usually only be considered true in a certain context. The "truth" of scientific statements cannot be judged without the theories and worldviews that go with them. In the same way - at least within existing moral systems or ethics - we can make truthful moral judgments. A completely different question is whether the underlying principles and value assumptions are generally acceptable and, in this sense, generally valid. 1.2. Are moral judgments binding? After the epistemological question of the truthfulness of moral judgments, we now turn to the question of their binding nature: Are moral judgments binding on everyone and, in this sense, generally valid, or are they a private matter? Is it up to each and every one to decide for themselves which principles they use to guide their actions, or does morality always contain the perspective of general validity and objectivity? The answer to these questions depends, of course, on our understanding of objectivity. Since we did not define objectivity as "correspondence with reality", the issue here is not whether the morally correct exists in reality or only in our heads. Rather, it is about whether and under what conditions moral judgments can in principle be comprehensible and thus generalizable. Subjectivist ethics emphasize that the decision between good and bad is a purely subjective one. Ethics that claim to be objective strive to formulate and substantiate normative statements in such a way that others can in principle recognize their validity. It is obvious that this alternative is related to the question of the principle of recognizability of right and wrong. 35 see the definition of the concept of objectivity in Chap. II 36 Example of moral-philosophical foundations On the binding nature of moral judgments based on the example "The extermination of a species is morally wrong" Whoever takes the view: "That may apply to some nature lovers, but I see it differently. Everyone has their own set of values ​​that just happen to coincide with those of others. So why should the judgment also apply to me? «Takes a subjectivist position. Anyone who argues against it: »If you think about it more carefully and take all aspects into account, you too must agree to this judgment. Otherwise you would consciously and against your better judgment or out of cynicism ignore arguments; that would be just as ridiculous as denying the validity of the case laws for you! ”takes an objectivist standpoint. 1.3. Are there criteria of good and bad that are independent of culture? The question of objective validity is in turn closely linked to the problem of cross-cultural generalizability. With regard to the global nature of the environmental problem, this is also relevant for nature conservation. Different cultures and societies, both inside and outside the western hemisphere, sometimes have very different moral rules, especially with regard to the appreciation and treatment of nature. The question now is whether one culture "knows better" than the other, whether there are criteria of what is morally correct that apply not only to members of a certain group, but to all people in general. The two possible extremes say that there should either be only one morality and one ethics for all people (universalism) or that due to the diversity of mutually incomparable morals or ethics, the possibility of cross-cultural and cross-social moral judgments is excluded and also undesirable (particularism ). Most of the time, the corresponding positions move in an intermediate area, in that certain moral norms (such as human rights) are understood as universal, others (such as socio-ethical norms) as culture-dependent, i.e. particular. Universalism considers it possible to find criteria of what is morally correct, to which all people - regardless of the moral-philosophical foundations of cultural affiliation, gender, social rank, religion - can justifiably agree. Particularism insists on the inevitable dependence of ethical judgments on their cultural and historical context and denies that justified universal ethical norms and judgments are possible. On the universality of moral judgments using the example "The extermination of a species is morally wrong" In view of the global nature of many environmental problems, it is often argued: "In every state and every culture, the extermination of a species is morally reprehensible." This is a universalist position. The particularist counter-position would be: "We are not entitled to impose moral rules on other cultures." Extreme particularism would even condemn the attempt to use arguments to promote one's own position in other cultures. The core of a particularist view remains in any case: "If other cultures do not want to condemn the extermination of species, we must not condemn these people morally." 1.4. Theory and Practice of Determining the Status of Moral Judgments The considerations on the status of moral judgments should not be misunderstood as describing the real situation. Anyone who advocates a universalist view nevertheless knows that almost no moral norm is actually accepted or even obeyed everywhere. The demand for universalization, however, is not canceled by a particularism that has been found. The possibility of assessing the recognizability, binding force and scope of moral norms and judgments is not about the question of whether the actually existing norms are true, objective and universally valid. Rather, it is a question of whether the demand that they should be true, objective and universally valid is itself reasonable, namely justified, and is therefore rightly made. 37 Example 38 Moral-philosophical foundations Examples, see also slide 4 2. Justification of morality If you ask yourself about the authority that ultimately dictates why people should act morally and which norms and values ​​are valid, five essential instances can be identified as possible sources of the Differentiate between morals: Religion: The basis of morality is belief in a transcendent authority. Nature: The basis of morality is the natural order. Culture or society: the basis of morality are cultural tradition or social conventions Feeling or intuition: the basis of morality are individual feelings or intuitions Reason: the basis of morality are rational considerations Fundamental instances to justify morality Examples from natural ethics • Religion: »Plants and animals are creatures of God. According to God's will, people are obliged to respect all of creation. «• Natural order:» Natural systems show the principles of diversity, sustainability or recycling. We should follow nature and give such principles moral validity. «• Society:» Every culture or society determines how its members have to deal with the wealth of nature for the individual or collective good. This existing morality is binding for everyone. "• Feeling:" When I see a pack of monkeys enjoying their life, I feel that these living beings have self-worth that is independent of me. This awakens in me a feeling of respect, which I am inclined to follow. «• Reason:» All people today and those living after us need and want nature. Nobody can wearily want us and our descendants to live in a poisoned and biologically impoverished world. ”In our definition of the term, we have stated that normative ethics strives for the generalizability of its judgments in the effort to determine the morally correct behavior. Moral-philosophical foundations therefore depend on the comprehensibility of their argumentation. It must therefore base its norms and instructions on values ​​or principles that can claim general recognition. If this is accepted as a justified claim to moral norms, certain preliminary decisions are made with regard to possible justification authorities: An ethics that sees itself as a moral philosophy in this sense can neither rely on religion nor on nature nor on social customs nor on feelings as the ultimate justification authorities appointed. Religious beliefs are not shared by all members of society. They are only binding for believers, so they do not meet the criterion of generalizability. Nature as the source of morality or as a moral model is to be excluded with reference to the fallacy of the should-be. For this reason, certain religious, metaphysical or emotion-based interpretations of nature cannot be universally binding. Not everything that a society considers morally permissible withstands critical reflection. Some conventions that were unquestionably valid in earlier societies, we reject today for moral reasons, for example slavery or discrimination based on race and gender. The following generally applies to companions: Since they are inevitably subjective, they cannot imply moral obligations to anyone. But they can have an indicator function. Moral outrage can be a valuable indicator that something is "rotten" about an action or theory. So it is also common in moral philosophy to question moral feelings in thought experiments to test ethical theories: If a moral principle leads in individual cases to consequences that conflict with the moral feeling (counterintuitive consequences), this can be a reason to rethink the principle or to reconsider it to look for other, more convincing reasons. 39 »> Well-founded< ist="" eine="" moralform="" dann,="" wenn="" sie="" mit="" gründen="" gerechtfertigt="" werden="" kann,="" die="" beanspruchen="" dürfen,="" aus="" der="" perspektive="" eines="" jeden="" einsichtig="" zu="" sein.«="" (ot!="" 1996:="" 96)="" 40="" beispiel="" »allgemeingültigkeit="" heißt="" dabei="" zweierlei:="" daß="" die="" nonn="" flir="" alle="" personen="" und="" situationen="" eines="" bestimmten="" allgemeinen="" typs="" gilt,="" nicht="" nur="" flir="" irgendwelche="" bestimmten="" individuen,="" bestimmte="" situationen,="" bestimmte="" regionen="" und="" zeiträume,="" und="" daß="" sie="" im="" prinzip="" gegenüber="" jedennann="" rational="" gerechtfertigt="" und="" gegenüber="" jedem,="" der="" ihre="" geltung="" bezweifelt,="" rational="" begründet="" werden="" kann.«="" (bimbacher="" 1980:="" 113)="" moralphilosophische="" grundlagen="" kontraintuitive="" konsequenzen="" a)="" wer="" gleiches="" lebensrecht="" für="" alle="" lebewesen="" fordert,="" hat="" keine="" möglichkeit,="" zwischen="" dem="" recht="" auf="" leben="" eines="" menschen="" und="" dem="" lebensrecht="" einer="" möglicherweise="" malaria="" übertragenden="" mücke="" zu="" differenzieren.="" auch="" die="" bekämpfung="" krankheitsübertragender="" insekten="" wäre="" dann="" verboten.="" das="" lebensrecht="" eines="" menschen="" und="" das="" einer="" mücke="" tatsächlich="" gleichzusetzen,="" dürfte="" aber="" spontan="" den="" moralischen="" überzeugungen="" (intuitionen)="" der="" meisten="" personen="" widersprechen.="" die="" forderung="" nach="" gleichen="" rechten="" für="" alle="" organismen="" müßte="" demnach="" aufgegeben="" und="" möglicherweise="" durch="" eine="" abstufung="" solcher="" rechte="" ersetzt="" werden.="" b)="" wenn="" es="" ein="" generelles="" naturschutzprinzip="" wäre,="" der="" artenvielfalt="" auf="" jeder="" einzelfläche="" die="" höchste="" priorität="" im="" naturschutz="" einzuräumen,="" wären="" artenreiche="" biotope="" immer="" wertvoller="" als="" artenarme.="" von="" natur="" aus="" relativartenarme="" lebensgemeinschaften="" wie="" die="" in="" hochmooren="" wären="" also="" durch="" düngung="" »aufzuwerten«.="" eine="" solche="" maßnahme="" dürfte="" den="" überzeugungen="" der="" meisten="" im="" naturschutz="" engagierten="" widersprechen.="" das="" ziel="" artenvielfalt="" wird="" daher="" stets="" mit="" kriterien="" wie="" seltenheit="" oder="" naturnähe="" abgewogen="" und="" bezieht="" sich="" meist="" auf="" größere="" flächeneinheiten="" wie="" bundesländer="" oder="" staaten.="" wenn="" moralische="" normen="" in="" einer="" gesellschaft="" demokratischen="" typs="" allgemein="" anerkannt="" werden="" sollen,="" müssen="" die="" ihnen="" zugrundeliegenden="" werte="" und="" prinzipien="" mit="" argumenten="" begründet="" werden="" können.="" diesem="" ansatz="" ist="" die="" hier="" vertretene="" ethik="" verpflichtet.="" er="" allein="" kommt="" in="" frage,="" wenn="" der="" anspruch="" auf="" allgemeingültigkeit,="" d.="" h.="" auf="" begründete="" allgemeinverbindlichkeit="" eingelöst="" werden="" soll.="" auch="" eine="" auf="" vernunft="" basierende="" ethik="" darf="" jedoch="" normativ="" aufgeladene="" naturbilder,="" gefühle="" und="" religiöse="" haltungen="" nicht="" einfach="" ignorieren.="" emotionalität="" und="" spiritualität="" haben="" für="" viele="" menschen="" große="" bedeutung.="" die="" achtung="" vor="" der="" würde="" und="" autonomie="" anderer="" menschen="" kann="" es="" durchaus="" gebieten,="" bei="" konkreten="" entscheidungen="" auch="" gefühle="" und="" einstellungen="" zu="" respektieren,="" die="" man="" selbst="" nicht="" teilt.="" moralphilosophische="" grundlagen="" 3.="" prinzipien="" oder="" handlungsfolgen?="" aufgabe="" nonnativer="" ethik="" ist="" die="" aufstellung="" von="" moralischen="" regeln="" und="" die="" bewertung="" von="" handlungsweisen.="" ob="" dabei="" die="" handlungsweisen="" als="" solche="" bewertet="" werden="" oder="" aber="" die="" (eingetretenen="" oder="" voraussichtlichen)="" handlungsfolgen,="" kennzeichnet="" unterschiedliche="" argumentationsansätze="" in="" der="" ethik.="" konsequentialistische="" ethiken="" bewerten="" eine="" handlungsweise="" nach="" ihren="" folgen.="" hierher="" gehören="" die="" im="" angelsächsischen="" sprachraum="" dominierenden="" utilitaristischen="" ethiken.="" ihr="" prinzip="" ließe="" sich="" in="" etwa="" so="" fonnulieren:="" handle="" stets="" so,="" daß="" durch="" dein="" handeln="" und="" seine="" folgen="" das="" allgemeine="" glück="" oder="" die="" allgemeine="" wohlfahrt="" gemehrt="" wird.="" es="" kommt="" also="" auf="" die="" ergebnisse="" und="" die="" folgen="" einer="" handlungsweise="" an.="" kategorisch="" verbotene="" handlungsweisen="" gibt="" es="" in="" diesem="" denkrahmen="" nicht.="" lügen,="" stehlen="" oder="" töten="" kann="" im="" einzelfall="" durch="" überwiegend="" positive="" handlungsfolgen="" legitimiert="" sein.="" wir="" kennen="" das="" in="" der="" alltagsmoral="" beispielsweise="" als="" »notlüge«.="" deontologische="" ethiken="" dagegen="" bewerten="" in="" erster="" linie="" bestimmte="" handlungsweisen="" selbst.="" ihnen="" kommt="" es="" weniger="" auf="" die="" handlungsergebnisse="" und="" -folgen="" als="" auf="" die="" moralische="" richtigkeit="" der="" handlung="" selbst="" an.="" so="" ist="" es="" beispielsweise="" nach="" kant="" prinzipiell="" untersagt,="" einen="" menschen="" bloß="" als="" mittel="" zu="" gebrauchen="" und="" so="" seine="" selbstzwecklichkeit="" zu="" mißachten.="" die="" würde="" des="" menschen="" ist="" damit="" abwägungen="" mit="" anderen="" gütern="" entzogen.="" ähnlich="" kategorische="" verbote="" wünschen="" sich="" viele="" auch="" für="" den="" naturschutz.="" konsequentialistische="" und="" deontologische="" argumente="" ein="" konsequentialistisches="" argument="" für="" den="" artenschutz="" lautet:="" »wir="" dürfen="" diese="" art="" nicht="" ausrotten,="" weil="" ihr="" aussterben="" unannehmbare="" folgen="" hat«.="" in="" diesem="" fall="" wäre="" gegen="" die="" ausrottung="" der="" art="" dann="" nichts="" einzuwenden,="" wenn="" negative="" folgen="" mit="" sicherheit="" auszuschließen="" sind.="" ein="" deontologisches="" argument="" ist:="" »wir="" dürfen="" diese="" art="" nicht="" ausrotten,="" weil="" sie="" wie="" jede="" art="" einen="" wert="" an="" sich="" besitzt«.="" dieses="" prinzip="" gilt="" dann="" unabhängig="" von="" den="" folgen,="" also="" auch="" für="" arten,="" die="" für="" uns="" schädlinge="" oder="" krankheitserreger="" darstellen.="" 41="" beispiel="" 42="" das="" diskursprinzip="" d="" lautet:="" »gültig="" sind="" genau="" die="" handlungsnormen,="" denen="" alle="" möglicherweise="" betroffenen="" als="" teilnehmer="" in="" realen="" diskursen="" zustimmen="" könnten.«="" (habermas="" 1983:="" 101)="" das="" universalisierungsprinzip="" u="" besagt:="" »jede="" gültige="" norm="" muß="" der="" bedingung="" genügen,="" daß="" die="" folgen="" und="" nebenwirkungen,="" die="" sich="" aus="" einer="" allgemeinen="" befolgung="" der="" strittigen="" normen="" für="" die="" befriedigung="" der="" interessen="" eines="" jeden="" einzelnen="" voraussichtlich="" ergeben,="" von="" allen="" zwanglos="" akzeptiert="" (und="" den="" auswirkungen="" der="" bekannten="" alternativen="" regelungsmöglichkeiten="" vorgezogen)="" werden="" können.«="" (habermas="" 1983:="" 131)="" moralphilosophische="" grundlagen="" einwände="" gegen="" die="" extreme="" liegen="" auf="" der="" hand.="" während="" konsequentialistische="" ansätze="" gefahr="" laufen,="" sich="" zur="" erreichung="" des="" größten="" glücks="" der="" größten="" zahl="" von="" personen="" unmoralischer="" mittel="" zu="" bedienen="" (»der="" zweck="" heiligt="" die="" mittel«),="" riskieren="" deontologische="" ethiken,="" über="" der="" moralischen="" richtigkeit="" einer="" handlung="" ihre="" negativen="" folgen="" zu="" übersehen="" (»gut="" gemeint="" ist="" nicht="" immer="" gut«).="" den="" meisten="" utilitaristischen="" ethiken="" liegt="" ein="" (deontologisches)="" beurteilungsprinzip="" wie="" fairness="" oder="" gerechtigkeit="" zugrunde,="" und="" deontologische="" ethiken="" berücksichtigen="" häufig="" auch="" handlungsfolgen,="" so="" daß="" der="" unterschied="" zwischen="" diesen="" bei="" den="" klassen="" von="" ethiken="" in="" der="" praxis="" oft="" nicht="" so="" groß="" ist,="" wie="" er="" in="" der="" theorie="" erscheint.="" 4.="" vorbedingungen="" der="" einigung="" über="" moralische="" fragen="" da="" vieles="" bei="" der="" moralischen="" beurteilung="" menschlichen="" handeins="" strittig="" sein="" kann,="" ist="" es="" wichtig,="" die="" bedingungen="" zu="" formulieren,="" unter="" denen="" über="" moralische="" fragen="" sinnvoll="" und="" mit="" aussicht="" auf="" vernünftige="" einigung="" gestritten="" werden="" kann.="" ein="" anspruchsvolles="" modell="" der="" meinungsfindung="" über="" moralnormen="" stellt="" die="" diskursethik="" dar.="" sie="" bindet="" die="" gültigkeit="" von="" normen="" an="" ihre="" zustimmungsfähigkeit="" (diskursprinzip="" )="" und="" formuliert="" regeln="" des="" argumentierens,="" die="" gewährleisten,="" daß="" alle="" in="" einem="" bestimmten="" handlungszusammenhang="" stehenden="" und="" alle="" von="" ihm="" betroffenen="" den="" normen="" zur="" beurteilung="" dieser="" handlungsweise="" und="" ihrer="" folgen="" zustimmen="" können="" (universalierungsprinzip).="" die="" diskursethik="" zielt="" also="" nicht="" direkt="" auf="" konkrete="" werte="" oder="" normen,="" sondern="" sie="" gibt="" ein="" verfahren="" an,="" wie="" einigung="" über="" moralische="" prinzipien="" und="" praktische="" fragen="" erreicht="" werden="" soll.="" das="" oft="" falsch="" verstandene="" konsensprinzip="" besagt,="" daß="" als="" ergebnis="" der="" argumentation="" alle="" beteiligten="" derselben="" inhaltlichen="" position="" zwanglos="" zustimmen.="" dies="" darf="" nicht="" mit="" einem="" kompromiß="" verwechselt="" werden,="" bei="" dem="" divergierende="" auffassungen="" bestehen="" bleiben,="" aber="" zum="" zwecke="" der="" einigung="" wechselseitige="" zugeständnisse="" gemacht="" werden.="" es="" ist="" zu="" erwarten,="" daß="" bei="" den="" meisten="" umweltethischen="" problemen="" und="" bei="" der="" entwicklung="" von="" leitbildern="" nicht="" -="" wie="" theoretisch="" angestrebt="" -="" konsense,="" sondern="" kompromisse="" am="" ende="" stehen,="" die="" zudem="" nicht="" selten="" als="" »faul«="" empfunden="" werden.="" somit="" unterscheiden="" sich="" pluralistische="" »diskurse«="" und="" diskursethik.="" auf="" der="" ebene="" der="" bedingungen="" rur="" gesellschaftliche="" moralphilosophische="" grundlagen="" debatten="" gibt="" die="" diskursethik="" jedoch="" wichtige="" nonnative="" ausgangsprinzipien="" vor:="" berücksichtigung="" aller="" betroffenen,="" berücksichtigung="" aller="" argumente,="" fairness="" (herrschaftsfreiheit,="" kein="" zwang)="" im="" dialog,="" rationalität="" des="" argumentierens.="" diese="" vier="" prinzipien="" können="" als="" maßstab="" auch="" für="" praktische="" verfahren="" und="" situationen="" (»reale="" diskurse«)="" dienen.="" entscheidungsfindungen="" in="" der="" umweltplanung="" und="" -politik="" sind="" daraufhin="" zu="" befragen,="" ob="" diese="" basisanforderungen="" erfüllt="" worden="" sind.="" dies="" bietet="" eine="" wichtige="" grundlage="" zur="" kritik="" an="" unfairen="" debatten="" und="" entscheidungen,="" bei="" denen="" naturschutzaspekte="" nicht="" zur="" kenntnis="" genommen="" werden.="" während="" die="" diskursethik="" die="" berücksichtigung="" von="" naturschutz-interessen="" einfordern="" kann,="" ist="" sie="" jedoch="" nicht="" dazu="" geeignet,="" auch="" deren="" durchsetzung="" zu="" garantieren.="" über="" moralisch="" strittige="" fragen="" müssen="" real="" zu="" führende="" diskurse="" entscheiden,="" das="" gebot="" der="" abwägung="" mit="" anderen="" anliegen="" bleibt="" also="" erhalten.="" 43="">

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Summary

Why should people protect nature? Should nature be preserved in a certain state or should its development be allowed to run free? Is there a need for a new ethic today to put nature at the center of human conservation efforts, or are conventional justifications sufficient? How are moral arguments for nature conservation and concrete conservation strategies related? The philosophical literature available so far is of little help in practice: due to its great abstractness, concrete references are largely lacking.

Anyone interested in the subject of nature conservation and ethics can now get a generally understandable overview with the work of Eser / Potthast. The theoretical principles of ecology and the moral-philosophical prerequisites for nature conservation are presented here in a practice-oriented manner and illustrated with concrete examples; central terms and questions are explained in clear diagrams.

The volume is aimed at everyone involved in nature conservation: be it in authorities, in associations, in environmental policy or in nature conservation centers. Above all, it is also ideal for teachers of biology and ethics.